for Victor Belcher's informative account of the attorney Robert Andrews-a key figure in the development of the Grosvenor estates from the early 1720s onwards. 4 On this still ill-studied scene, two landmarks loom large in Robson's monograph, and also in Michael Birk's Gentlemen of the Law (1960)-a general history of the lower branch of the legal profession. One is the foundation in the metropolis by 1740 of the Society of Gentlemen Practisers (SGP)-a voluntary body whose hundred or so members in its early years included both attorneys and solicitors. 5 The other is Parliament's passage in 1729 (2 Geo. II c.23) of the Act "for the better regulation of attorneys and solicitors". This statute is noteworthy for its requirements that all presently-practising attorneys and solicitors be registered by 1 December 1730 in the courts in which they acted and that all subsequent entrants have served an apprenticeship of at least five years. The Act has also been remarked for its coverage of two once distinct sub-branches of the profession-the attorneys, who traditionally specialised in litigation in the courts of law, and the solicitors who, among other activities, acted in causes before Chancery and other courts of equity. Even so, the two groups were not treated altogether even-handedly "by Parliament: while attorneys could register under the Act to practise in the courts of equity (and without additional fees), solicitors were not accorded reciprocity in the courts of law.
In turn, the establishment of the SGP and the 1729 statute have often been linked together in accounts of the lower branches of the legal profession. The immediate occasion of the Act was a number of petitions from the Yorkshire Justices of the Peace (petitions came from the bench of all three ridings) complaining of the activities of "the great number" of ill-qualified practitioners who "prosecute trifling actions ... and defend against suits commenced for just cause". On the one hand, these petitions expressed in identical terms the perennial criticism that inferior members of the profession were a principal cause of the costliness of going to law and of the multitude of suits. The petitioners particularly complained of those "who have not had the regular education of an attorney" and Holmes suggests that it was the solicitors who were probably the chief grievance, partly because many did lack formal training but also because the number of solicitors had grown very substantially. 6 On the other hand, the Act of 1729 was only one element in a broader agitation for reform of legal processes that was mounted in and out of Parliament during the later 1720s and early 1730s-an agitation which encompassed inquiries into the rising fees taken by court officials, proposals for expediting of cases involving small debts, and the enactment in 1731 of a statute stipulating that henceforth the courts of common law must keep their records in English. 7 As the 1729 Act defined for the future the qualifications of "attorneys" and "solicitors", so the formation of the SGP can be viewed, at least in part, as a response to that legislation by a segment of the metropolitan practisers. In the first place, the SGP declared its primary objective to be "to discountenance ... all male and unfair practice", and the Society did indeed seek the disqualification of a number of practitioners who had been guilty of abuses. In the second place, the SGP sought to maintain the admission requirements of the 1729 statute. Thus, at a general meeting in early 1743 "it was ordered that all proper and necessary enquiries be made ... to discover any attornies or solicitors who had been or should be surreptitiously admitted" to practice in the courts. And the SGP also took steps to ward off the attempts of lesser judicial officials such as the clerks of Chancery (who had been explicitly excluded from the registration requirements of the 1729 Act) to register under the Act and thereby qualify to take on two additional apprentices.' In the third place, the founding of the SGP has been read by Holmes and others as a signal of the breaking down of any remaining distinctions between attorneys and solicitors (as defined by the 1729 Act), at least in the metropolis. To be sure, it was not until the re-enactment of the 1729 statute in amended form in 1750 that solicitors were accorded the privilege of practising in the courts of law, but in Holmes's view the "barriers between the two groups had effectively disappeared well before then ... when the attorneys of London and the adjacent counties formed their professional organisation in or shortly before 1739, it was natural for them to admit their solicitor brethren on perfectly equal terms".'
If the SGP's concern with malpractice and its efforts to maintain the restrictions on admission imposed by the 1729 Act can be seen as the predictable emphases of a newly-emergent interest group intent upon self-justification and self-aggrandisement, its activities do seem to differentiate the membership's interests from the increasing emphasis on non-litigious business discerned by Robson and subsequent students of provincial attorneys."t Nor do the matters canvassed at the SGP's meetings altogether match with Belcher's observation, in his account of Robert Andrews, that even for London attorneys litigation was no longer their "most important activity"." But the fact that the business of the central courts had been on the decline for close to four decades before the passage of the 1729 Act may help to explain not only the lesser legal practitioners' apparent acquiescence in its adoption (in 1707 no less than 1,169 signatures were gathered for a petition to the Treasury on behalf of attorneys threatened with prosecution for non-payment of stamp duties but not a single petition from practitioners was received by the Commons against the projected legislation) but also-the SGP's formation and continuing zeal to protect the preserves of its members.' 2 
II
While the extent of the London attorneys' and solicitors' involvement in, and dependence upon, litigation cannot be established from a review of the SGP's activities (not least because the Society enrolled only a small minority of metropolitan practitioners), neither can it be assumed that Andrews' concentration on conveyancing, drafting, advising, and business management was typical. How the SPG fits into the larger universe of metropolitan practisers is also open to question, but both the pre-history of the SGP and the concerns of at least a number of other metropolitan practisers in the 1730s may be illuminated by the examination of the membership, interests, and careers of a hitherto unknown society of London practisers of the 1730s. The minutes of this "club", which survive only in truncated form, are among the Osborn collection (Osborn Ms. c327) in the Beinecke Library of Yale University 13 They record some 56 meetings held weekly, save for the long summer vacations, between 24 April 1734 and 12 November 1735. Thus, they antedate by several years the beginning of the extant records of the SGP. Even so, the society whose gatherings they memorialise may well have had its precursors. After all, The Spectator of 7 May 1712 gives a satirical account of an earlier and not dissimilar group-"a Set of Men who call Themselves the Lawyers Club", whose members, "consist[ed] only of Attorneys", and who discussed legal causes of interest at their weekly gatherings, while considering how best to gouge their clients. 14 Although the group described in The Spectator may have been a creation of the author, it is noteworthy that the members of the club whose meetings are minuted in Osborn Ms. c327 also devoted their principal attention to arguing cases-cases cast in hypothetical form. Unlike the earlier group, however, this club's membership was not confined to attorneys, or at least to attorneys in the pre-1729 sense of the lesser practitioners in the courts of law. All told, the 24 individuals who figure in the document as past or present members were registered as attorneys under the terms of the 1729 Act, but at the same time virtually all of them were also registered as solicitors under the provision of the Act which accorded qualified attorneys free entry to the courts of equity as well.
As the dual qualifications of the members of this body look forward to the SGP's inclusion of solicitors together with attorneys, so there are other possible links between the club and the SGP. Although Osborn Ms. c327 records meetings only in 1734 and 1735, it also contains entries that indicate that this club was longer-lived. In its present form, the manuscript begins at page 9 in the midst of a list of orders or rules; the first entry is styled "item 20" and the last, running over to the top of page 11, is "item 24 15 There follows a list of 21 signatures (some with designations such as "President" or "Treasurer"); 10 of these are crossed out (and several of these are not easy to decipher). Pages 12-14 are given over to a series of individual orders; these bear dates from 19 June 1734 to 21 December 1737 and are signed by the presiding member at the meetings at which they were made. Then on pages 15-16 are entered the minutes of the first recorded meeting, that of 24 April 1734, followed by another series of orders apparently adopted at that meeting, including one which refers to three men "heretofore members of this Society who now" reside "in the Country" (who are to be treated as having thereby forfeited their voting rights but who will be welcome to attend meetings on those occasions when they are in town). It is, then, on the evidence of these orders that we may conclude that this club had been operating before 24 April 1734 and that it continued to convene at least until late December 1737.
In analysing the membership of the club, we have included not only those who attended the 1734-35 meetings minuted in the manuscript but also those who may be presumed to have attended any meetings of this group. Thus, our list of 24 members is composed of the 21 signatories to the rules and the three individuals "heretofore members" mentioned in the order of 24 April 1734. Of these 24, 18 actually are recorded as attending meetings minuted in the manuscript; four more signed the membership list on page 11 and, we deduce, attended meetings subsequent to the last recorded in the manuscript (the names of three of these four are included in or attached to the various supplementary orders on pages 12-14); and two were only members prior to 24 April 1734 and did not attend any of the minuted meetings as visitors. (For these and other details about the 24 members discussed in succeeding paragraphs, see Appendix I.)
As the club's existence as late as December 1737 and the abrupt beginning of the extant minutes of the SGP in February 1740 raises the possibility of a direct connection between the two groups, so the surviving rules of the club, which chiefly concern' qualifications for membership, strengthen this possibility. Granted, the provision of "item 22" that members "must be of some profession immediately relating to the law" does not much narrow the field of inquiry. But "item 23" is both specific and suggestive in excluding from the club's ranks any who "belongs to any of the Offices of the Courts of Equity or the Court of the Pleas of the Exchequer". Here, we appear to have a very clear link between the exclusion of judicial office-holders from the 1729 registration provisions and the SGP's later efforts to keep the clerks of the courts of equity from enrolment under those provisions.
We can also detect a significant, though limited, overlap in membership between the club and the SGP. Of the 24 members of the club, four can be identified with reasonable confidence among the over 100 individuals who figure in the records of the SGP during its early decades; moreover, the brief listings of attendants at SGP general meetings open up the possibility that another three club members may also have been members of the SGP. 16 To be sure, the activities of the two societies were quite different. Nonetheless, it may be worthwhile to pursue a little further the question of the identity of the members of the club which met weekly in term at the Falcon in Fetter Lane and subsequently at the Apple Tree Tavern in Cursitors Alley.
In the first place, the members, though admitted as solicitors in the courts of equity (principally Chancery) after the 1729 Act, initially qualified as attorneys. Of the 22 who can be definitely identified in the registration lists kept by the various courts after 1729, all but seven first qualified or enrolled themselves in the Court of Common Pleas, with at least six of the remaining enrolling first in the Court of King's Bench. 17 In the second place, it appears that 13 of the 22 were already in practice by the deadline of 1 December 1730 for registration under the 1729 Act. 8 In turn, the dates of enrolment for the remaining nine members, ranging from early 1731 to early 1736, suggest that this was a group of relatively young men-a hypothesis strengthened by biographical information gleaned from a number of sources, principally the apprenticeship registers kept under the statute of 1710 and the probate records of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury. Apprenticeship indentures for five of the 22 have been found: all were made within the span of years from 1724 to 1730.9 In addition, dates of death for nine of the 22 (including three for whom we have found apprenticeship indentures) have been established: the earliest comes in the late 1730s (with his mother being made administratrix of his property), but the remaining eight all lived into the mid-1760s with the longest-lived surviving into the 1790s. 2 ' To judge, then, from their dates either of death or apprenticeship, at least seven of the 13 members who registered before 1 Dec. 1730 were recent entrants to practice, while we may presume that all nine who registered thereafter were newcomers-i.e., that at least 16 of the 22 began practising contemporaneously with or in the years immediately after the passage of the registration Act.
As a substantial majority of the club's membership were relatively junior practitioners, so at least some were linked by common origins in the counties of the north and north-west. Of the 10 identifiable individuals who attended the first recorded meeting of 24 April 1734 (and who supplied all the attenders at the next seven meetings as well), at least five are known either to have originated in the counties of Cumberland, Lancashire and Cheshire, or to have settled into 17 Whether Lucas's registration in King's Bench preceded his registration in Chancery is unclear from the record, though given the terms of the 1729 statute it seems very likely his registration in King's Bench came first. See Appendix I numbers 2 and 6 for the two unidentifiable members and the difficulties in disentangling the five or more John Browns and the two John Bakers. practice there. 21 Furthermore, four of the other 12 identifiable members originated in the northern counties. 2 By contrast, we have been able to identify only one of the members as a possible Londoner *21 in origin.
Whatever the birthplaces of those who joined the club, most seem to have spent their working lives in the metropolis. All told, 10 of the 22 can definitely be traced as practitioners in the central courts beyond the mid-1730s, four of these as late as the 1770s. 24 By contrast, only four can definitely be traced as practising in the provinces. 25 And of the remaining eight, at least four seem likely also to have been based in London. 26 At the same time, we ought to avoid making too hard-and-fast a distinction between metropolitan and provincial practitioners. Those of the club's members who figure in the records of King's Bench and Common Pleas as practisers beyond the mid1730s seem to have specialised to a degree in cases from particular regions; for instance, Thomas Strickland, who originated in Westmorland, seems to have derived a good deal of business from his native and other northern counties, though he is also recorded as the attorney for cases emanating from Middlesex and Berkshire as well as from Herefordshire and several of the Welsh counties. Again, several London-based men had other strong links in the provinces as well. Thus, George Boughey, who was apprenticed in 1730 without specification of parentage or place of origin to a London attorney, qualified as a practiser in Common Pleas in 1736 as of the "Inner Temple", and described himself in his will of 1788 as of the Inner Temple, not only specialised in litigation for Staffordshire and adjacent counties but also instructed his executors to bury him in Audley, Staffordshire, where he held land inherited from his father. Similarly, William Lucas, another London-based practitioner, described himself in his will of 1773 as of the Middle Temple and of Preston, Lancashire. His was a rather unusual story in that in midcareer, after being admitted to the Inner Temple in 1744, he was called to the Bar and acquired a series of posts in the judicial administration of the Duchy of Lancaster. In turn, he instructed his executors (his brother Henry and two men who actually performed the duties of his posts in the Duchy administration) that he be buried in the parish church of Garstang, Lancashire-close by the graves of his parents and his deceased wife.
III
While the line between provincial and metropolitan practitioners was not always clear-cut, examination of the proceedings of the club does indicate that what brought the members together was more than sociability, perhaps fostered by geographical ties. For the business of the club, at least the business recorded in the minutes, did not vary significantly over these 56 meetings. At each and every meeting but that of 2 July 1735 (when the president had neglected to make the usual preparations), the members present "argued" a hypothetical case that had been distributed to them at the previous meeting. The only other deviations from this routine came on two occasions when the members prolonged over a second meeting the discussion of a single hypothetical. 2 7 In toto, then, the manuscript contains an abstract of 53 hypothetical cases mooted by the club's members, with but little variation in the format of the record. The entry for each meeting is dated. A statement of the hypothetical case to be discussed is set out. A question is posed, the members in attendance (no less than five and often double that number) are enumerated, and the resolution of the questionbe it unanimous or by the majority-is noted. 28 Unfortunately, the minutes do not state the reasoning that underlay the members' resolutions. However, in slightly less than half the cases, authority for the position adopted is given. 29 And in two other cases, the dissenters formulated protests spelling out the grounds of their disagreement. 3°T he recitation in the manuscript of the case to be mooted differs to a degree from meeting to meeting in the extent of detail given. Most often, the case is set out in the form of a hypothetical-a form recognisable to a modern law student. The cases discussed at the first recorded meeting may serve as an illustration: demise enters, and paid A £50 for the rent due at Michas., but A dying on the 23rd March last two Days before the other £50 became due C refused to pay the same to B or the extors. of A Q. How and by whom can the last £50 be recovered
In the succeeding hypotheticals, the parties are also indicated by letters rather than by name, although one specifically asks whether a prohibition will lie against the Archdeacon of Richmond (Yorkshire). 3 2 Place names, too, are rarely given. This lack of specificity renders it very difficult to link these hypotheticals with reported cases or with cases of the day in which the members may have been involved.
Towards the end of the manuscript, the recitation of the cases becomes terser. For example, the penultimate case simply reads: Despite the increasing brevity with which the questions were stated, pointers to the sources of the hypotheticals are provided by the citations of case authority entered for 21 of the 50 resolved cases. 3 5 Tracking of these citations demonstrates that a number of the hypotheticals were taken almost verbatim from case reports. 36 Thus, the hypothetical discussed on 11 June 1735, dealing with the liability of a carrier who was robbed of a box entrusted to him, states that the carrier had been advised by the owner that it contained "Books and Tobacco when in fact there was £100 in money" and the question posed is whether the carrier was liable for the loss of the money or "those particulars only that A [the bailor] acquainted him with"? 3 7 These exact particulars, down to the books and tobacco, came before King's Bench in Kenrig v. Eggleston. 3 1 Similarly, the hypothetical considered on 20 November 1734 was derived from a reference made [19901 C.L.J. 39 One hypothetical was of more recent vintage, thereby giving us some measure of the members' familiarity with cases not yet in print. The hypothetical for 27 November 1734 deals with the admissibility of parole statements of a testator who had left his wife a legacy and made her his executrix but had not disposed of the rest of his personal property.' Here, the minutes make reference to Hatton v. Hatton, a case decided by the Master of the Rolls the previous year, with the citation being simply to term and court. 41 Coke's Institutes appears to be the source of two other hypotheticals. 42 One of these (that for 20 August 1735) deals with the performance under a bond: 43 A is bound by £20 to deliver a horse by a stated date; on the day stipulated for performance B accepts £10 in full satisfaction: is the condition fulfilled, or may B bring an action on the bond?
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Coke uses this very hypothetical to make the point that where there is a condition to do a collateral act an accord will not preclude the obligee from bringing an action for the forfeiture.
As consideration of the sources of the hypotheticals argued by the members of the club illustrates their familiarity with the printed reports and other authorities, as well as their knowledge of recent litigation, so a survey of the questions raised by the hypotheticals should shed some light on the kinds of legal issues these London practitioners found it useful or interesting to discuss. Table I , then, sets out the subject matter of the 53 hypotheticals or mooted cases.
The assumptions underlying the categorisations employed in constructing Table I may be briefly spelled out. In the first place, it should be noted that there are 74, not 53, entries for subject-matter. This reflects our sense that 18 of the hypotheticals appear to be susceptible to inclusion under more than one of the categories employed. For example, the hypothetical for 24 April 1734, quoted above, has been read as raising two issues.' One is a matter of procedure (i.e., having to do either with choice of forum, process of the court, or execution of judgment): "How" can the rent of £50 be recovered when a landlord dies before the rent is due? The other is a matter of the substantive law of leaseholds: "By whom" may the rent be collected? In the second place, we have divided substantive issues of law into two broad categories-those dealing with property (in turn, broken down into six sub-categories) and those dealing with commercial relations (three sub-categories). On this logic, property issues constitute roughly two thirds (31 of 49) of the substantive matters raised by the hypotheticals. In total (but leaving aside the two ecclesiastical issues), procedural questions constitute slightly more than one third of the matters (24 of 71) we have identified, property questions nearly another four ninths (31 of 71), and commercial questions the remaining three ninths (16 of 71). 45 While the subject-matter of the hypotheticals clearly indicates that the members of the club were concerned with more than the "mechanics" of practice in the courts, we should bear in mind that at least some of the substantive matters raised would be of interest to conveyancers as well as to practitioners in the courts.46 In addition to the two hypotheticals focusing on mortgages, ten others involve family settlements. 47 In general, these hypotheticals are concerned with who takes under the terms of a given settlement (whose provisions are set out in the recitation) under specified circumstances. Arguably, the discussion of these matters was as likely to have been directed towards improving draftsmanship as towards prevailing in litigation. Again, the five hypotheticals focusing on the probate of testaments might also betoken a concern with drafting. 48 At the least, we ought to bear in mind that the distinction between litigation and other legal activities should not be too sharply drawn. As the hypotheticals combine matters of substance and procedure, so they also include both questions of law and equitable issues. The members of our club may have enrolled first in the courts of law but most also enrolled in the Court of Chancery, and their interest in equitable remedies comes through clearly in the hypotheticals. Referring back to the entries in Table I , we may observe that the Court of Chancery's jurisdiction in this period encompassed both probate matters and mortgage disputes; then, too, controversies over family settlements often had to be settled by the Lord Chancellor and his colleagues.
In turn, the members' invocation of legal authority likewise suggests that they travelled in a legal realm in which traditional distinctions between law and equity, and between the litigation of legal and equitable issues, were disappearing. And since the mooted hypotheticals were often derived from reported cases, a survey of the forums in which the cases cited had been decided should reflect much the same range of interests as do the hypotheticals. Table II , then, furnishes a summary of the frequency with which cases were cited in the minutes while Table III Altogether, authority was cited for close to one half of the hypotheticals resolved by the members. Most often (13 instances), the citation was to a single case in the printed reports, sometimes the one from which the hypothetical was derived. In eight moots, however, two or more reported cases were cited.
5
" But even where a cited case had been printed in more than one report, the practice (save in a single instance) was to cite only one report. 5 " In turn, as Table III indicates, the 31 cases cited were decided in I Ibid. In the one instance in which a non-judicial authority was cited, the reference was to Co.Litt (Appendix 11, 34).
Ibid.
What is perhaps surprising, given that the majority of these attorneys had registered to practise in the Court of Common Pleas, is that the number of cases drawn from King's Bench far outstrips the total drawn from Common Pleas. No obvious explanation for this seeming discrepancy is available, but two points are worth suggesting. First, although only seven of the 22 identifiable members enrolled in King's Bench, no less than 14 of them can be traced as practising in that court. 52 We should not assume, then, that the court of law in which an attorney registered was the only one in which he would practice. And second, it may well be relevant that, in general, seventeenth and early eighteenth century cases from Common Pleas were less fully reported than those from King's Bench.
Turning from the body of citations to the four very recent cases cited (in three separate moots), two were from King's Bench, 5 3 one from Chancery, 54 and one a case on appeal in the House of Lords.
55
In three of the four instances, the manuscript refers to them by case name, court and term but the other reference is vaguer-"ye Court of B R having determined it so ye last day of Hillary Term
[_5].56
As with the citations to older cases, these four citations to quite recent cases also concern a variety of issues. In one of the moots citing a recent King's Bench case, two older cases'are also cited. The hypothetical in question therein raised a rather technical issue in property law: whether a widow can receive her dower from estates settled on her husband for life, remainder to his first and succeeding sons in tail. 57 The recent case is that of Hooker v. Hooker, which came to King's Bench from Chancery for an opinion of the judges. The case was argued before King's Bench on three separate occasions before it was finally resolved in the widow's favour. 58 The other recent King's Bench case was not referred to by name and has not been located in any printed report. The dispute was over process: whether it is permissible to retake a person who was arrested by process from an inferior court of record and who then escaped out of that jurisdiction without an escape warrant from the Chief Justice of King's Bench. The two other recent cases were both cited in the hypothetical discussed above concerning the admissibility of parol evidence to prove that the testator who left his wife a legacy and made her his executrix intended her to have the residue of his personal estate in her own right or as a trustee for his heirs. The manuscript entry reads: 5 9 Resolved by a Majority that Parole Evidence will be admitted It was allowed by ye Ma. of ye Rolls in Hill. 6 Geo. 2d in Hatton v Hatton & his Decree afterwards affirmed by King, Chancellor on an appeal-It was allowed also in ye Case of Littlebury & Buckley in ye House of Lords.
Two other hypotheticals also illustrate the members' selection of issues for discussion that were of current interest. The first, the initial hypothetical recorded in the club's minutes for the meeting of 24 April 1734 (and set out in full above), deals with the issue of whether rent can be collected by either the executor or the heir of the lessor (a life tenant who let for a term but dies before the expiration of the term and before the time due for payment) if the tenant quits immediately after the landlord's death.' The second, argued at the meeting of 13 August 1735, concerns a closely-related issue-whether the executor of a lessor or his heir was entitled to the rent if the lessor died "about noon" on the date due for tendering the quarterly rent. 6 " Although only older cases were cited on these two occasions, 62 the timeliness of these hypotheticals is suggested by the passage in 1738 of a statute that provided: 63 where any tenant for life shall happen to die before or on the day whic any rent was reserve or made payable upon any demise or lease of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, which determined on the death of such tenant for life, the executors or administrators of such tenant for life shall and may in an action on the case recover of or from the under-tenant . . . if such tenant die on the day on which the same was made payable the whole, or if before such day then a proportion of such rent, according to the time such tenant for life lived [shall be paid to the executor].
While the citations in the minutes provide evidence as to the members' knowledge of legal authority and of current litigation, the club's records do not provide much direct evidence as to the extent or tenor of the moots. To be sure, on 15 While this order might be variously interpreted either as an indicator of a serious lack of attention or as a measure of the seriousness with which the members took their debates, the fact that so many of the hypotheticals provoked argument and debate speaks to the latter reading. 65 As Table IV indicates, while ten of the hypotheticals were resolved unanimously, 32 of the 53 provoked disagreement, signalled by the scribe's notation that the eventual resolution was only by a majority.' Moreover, in two instances, the dissenters registered protests to the resolution reached by the majority, and these protests detail the arguments of the minority. 67 Thus, they provide the best evidence we have of the doctrinal competence of the membership of the club and of the intellectual quality of its debates. The first of the two protests was occasioned by discussion of a procedural issue: whether in an action for defamation the defendant waives the Statute of Limitations if, instead of raising the statute, he pleads not guilty. The majority took the view that the defendant could not raise the matter of "time" after issue was joined by the defendant's plea of not guilty.
The protesters offered three arguments against the majority's resolution. The first was that the statute "has in Express Words taken away the Pits. Cause of Action". On this point, they cited Saunders v. Edwards.' But though that case does hold that the statute is a bar to a cause of action in defamation, the defendant in Saunders had pleaded the statute and then the plaintiff had demurred. So, the procedural question posed by the hypothetical was not in dispute in
Saunders.
64 See Appendix 11. 65 For attendance figures, see note 28 above.
66 See Appendix I11. 67 Appendix I11: 4 and 6.
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The second point raised by the protestors was that the case on which the majority was relying had been Adjudged in the infancy of the statute & since that time the more modern resolutions appear to have been contrary particularly the case in Salk: 278.
The case invoked from Salkeld by the dissenters was an action in debt for rent. 69 The defendant had pleaded nil debit and, as in the mooted hypothetical, proceeded to give the Statute of Limitations in evidence. 7 1 Chief Justice Holt had held that the statute might be given in evidence after the plea of nil debit "for the statute has made it no debt at the time of the plea, the words of which are in the present tense". But it was also noted that in assumpsit the statute could not be given in evidence for it "speaks of a past time, and relates to the time of making the promise". We may ask, then, which side should have prevailed in the club's debate, given Holt's analysis in Saunders. A reading of the Statute of Limitations suggests that the protesters' position is the better one, for the articulation of the period of limitation for the action of defamation comes in the same section and is made in the same words as that with respect to debt for rent.
The protestors' final ground for dissent was not precedent but rather the kind of policy argument law students are often asked to formulate when precedent fails. They contended that the plaintiff should be required to come ready to argue that his cause of action was within the statute: after all, he was required to do so in actions of ejectment and trover, and to require him to do so in debt for rent puts him under no greater "inconvenience". This is certainly the case, but then the same logic might be applied to the plaintiff in assumpsit although Holt in Saunders had specifically distinguished that action from the action of debt for rent.
The second hypothetical which provoked a dissent involves greater complexities. The facts were as follows. A is entitled to £1000 due on a mortgage; prior to marriage, a settlement is executed giving her the power to dispose of Blackacre by deed or will notwithstanding her coverture; then by deed she grants Blackacre together with all her personal estate to.her husband; the husband dies leaving his personal estate to B and C. So, the question posed is, who is entitled to the money due on the mortgage-A or B and C? The majority held for A, the widow, but without citing authority.
In response, the protesters raised four points. The first is technical and appears to be rather weak. A feme covert can dispose of property with the consent of her husband, and such a disposition amounts to no more than a joint transfer by them. Thus far the reasoning is not problematic. If, however, the property in question is a chose in action, then the wife's transfer to the husband would be ineffective and so it would survive to her (which is correct). The protestors acknowledged that the mortgage was a chose in action but asserted that the property had been altered (to what is not said) by the wife's transfer. For this rather dubious assertion, no authority is cited.
The protestors' second point was more straightforward, yet not altogether persuasive. The husband might have disposed of the transferred mortgage during his lifetime but might not have done so because he believed that the deed enabled him to do so by will (which, arguendo, may be the case). However, the wife's transfer appears to have been gratuitous, and a reliance argument would be more compelling had there been consideration.
Having offered these two technical arguments, the protestors shifted to another tack and here they seem to be on firmer ground. Citing Blois v. The Viscountess of Hereford, 7 they noted that since A had an adequate marriage settlement she ought not to be able to keep her personal fortune as well. In Blois, the Lord Keeper had had to determine whether the marriage portion of the wife (an heiress) included her personal property; the marriage settlement specifically mentioned only her real property. But although the Lord Keeper had decided to treat her personal property as part of her portion, the applicability of Blois to the hypothetical is at best debatable since there is some question whether the principle of that case applies to choses in action, the property in dispute in the hypothetical, unless the jointure is out of proportion to the portiona point not included in the hypothetical.
The final point offered in support of their view by the protestors is somewhat obscure. As entered in the minutes, it reads: "Because the present Sollrs opinion is Directly agst the sd Resolution". Presumably, the reference is to the then Solicitor General Dudley Ryder, but it is not clear when and under what circumstances he had adopted the position attributed to him (or how the members had become acquainted with his views). 7 2 However serious the debates on the two occasions for which protests were entered and however sophisticated the analyses offered by the protestors, we cannot be sure that the discussion of the other hypotheticals was of comparable quality. Yet, there are a few other indicators in the manuscript of the seriousness with which the members took their debates. One is that on two occasions the decision on the hypothetical was carried over from one meeting to the following one. 73 Another, more clear-cut indicator of the extent of debate, interest of the participants, and expertise deployed is provided by the rehearing of a single hypothetical. On 12 March 1735, the members discussed the following issue: 74 Condition to make obligee a Lease for Life by such a day or pay him £100. Obligeee dyed before ye Day Q: Shall his Exects. have ye £100
On this occasion, the case was resolved (without indication of dissent) by the ten members in attendance, "notwithstanding ye Anonymous Case in 1st Salkeld fo: [ I". Although the minutes supply no page reference, the case is easy enough to find and does hold for the executor, distinguishing its facts from Laughter's Case (as reported by Coke). 75 Apparently, some of the members were dissatisfied with this resolution, for the hypothetical of 12 March was mooted again on 22 October 1735.76 No resolution was reached that evening, and the case was adjourned until the following week. Then on 29 October, with eight members in attendance (including seven who had been present at the first discussion of 12 March), it was "Resolved by a Majority" in favour of the executor. This time, in addition to Laughter's Case and the anonymous case in Salkeld, two more cases were cited.' None was precisely in point, yet it may be suggested that many a lawyer has used less persuasive authority in court to support his position than did the majority present at the club on 29 October.
IV
In conclusion, then, we would stress four points. First, we must acknowledge the fortuitousness of the survival (regrettably only in truncated form) of the manuscript recording the existence, membership and activities of this club. Certainly, we cannot be sure that this was the earliest such society of members of the lower branch of the legal profession operating in London; the account in The Spectator of an attorney's club meeting weekly in London in 1712 and debating causes speaks, if somewhat less than definitively, to the contrary. Second, we would emphasise that the club which has been our subject was meeting at an unusually significant time-the interval between the registration Act and the formation of the SGP-a time when formerly distinct groups of legal practisers, attorneys and solicitors, were beginning to coalesce, at least in the metropolis. And this process of coalescence is underlined by the dual qualifications of most of the members of our club and illuminated by the range of hypotheticals they discussed. Third, the increasing competence and self-confidence of at least some members of the lower branches of the profession is evident in the character of the club's debates. Thus, while The Spectator's account indicates that when the members of the club it describes encountered a question "of which they have no President, it is noted down by their Clark ... [so] that one of them may go the next Day with it to a Counsel", 78 the members of this club of the mid-1730s-though respectful of precedent-were also ready to interpret and apply for themselves the relevant legal authorities to the hypotheticals under discussion. 79 Moreover, their
self-confidence appears fully justifiable when the evidence allows us to get behind their resolutions and to examine their citations and, on occasion, their arguments. Finally, we would emphasise the need for further research on the lesser legal practitioners of the metropolis. On the one hand, we have suggested that the SGP's concern with restricting entry to practice in the courts and the club's concentration on the subjectmatter of litigation in their deliberations run contrary to Belcher's suggestion, made with respect to Andrews, that litigation formed a declining part of the London attorney's or solicitor's business. Moreover, in the years after their club apparently ceased to meet, at least some of its members built up successful practices, on occasion accompanied by the acquisition of positions in judicial administration. 8 But by no means all the members can be traced as successful members of their profession and, more generally, it is clear that the business of the central courts continued to lag through the middle decades of the eighteenth century. 8 ' What is needed, then, is a thorough canvass of the surviving but scattered papers of metropolitan 78 As note 15 above.
Two possible exceptions to this generalisation should be noted. These are the references to non-judicial opinions in the text: the first, the reference to Mr. Solicitor's opinion in the protest of 29 May 1734; the second, in a crossed-out section of the text of the majority's resolution of 5 Feb. 1735, the reference to the opinion of Edward Bootle, a barrister. On one or both occasions, a member (or members) of the Club may have solicited the views of these individuals before coming to the meeting. At the same time, it is worth noting that it was the losing side (the protesters) who invoked Mr. Solicitor's opinion. o Besides the rather unusual case, discussed above, of William Lucas, other success stories that can be established are those of Boughey, Fothergill, Kent, and Olivant. SI Brooks, "Interpersonal Conflict", pp. 363-364.
attorneys and solicitors and a careful tracking of the traces their activities have left in the records of both the central courts and the lesser jurisdictions of the metropolis. 8 " Only when those tasks are completed will we be able to generalise with any degree of confidence.
APPENDIX I: THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE CLUB Information about the 24 members has been organised under the following categories:
(1) first meeting of the club attended; (2) total number of meetings attended; and whether current member at end of 1737 or name crossed out in listing of club members; (five letters from the early 1740s to 1750). Kent handled both litigation-related and other matters for the Egcrtons and Leghs, and Kent's successful practice seems to have been continued in the later 18th century by the firm of Kent and Darlington, some of whose letters also survive in the Legh of Lyme collection. Our attention to the former group of Kent's letters was drawn by Aylett's use of this correspondence in his "Attorneys and Clients", pp. 346-349; however, we read them as indicating a closer professional and personal relationship between Kent and Samuel Egerton over the two decades than Aylett's account would suggest. Our thanks to Dr. Peter McNiven of the Rylands Library for informing us of Kent's letters to Peter Legh of Lyme and for making available copies of the two groups of Kent's letters.
(7) Prob. 6/115, batchelor, of St. Christopher le Stocks (admin. to his widowed mother Ann, 11/39).
APPENDIX 11: RULES AND.ORDERS OF THE CLUB
The manuscript begins, in medias res, at p. 9 with "item 20" and goes on through "item 25" at p. 11. These "items" or rules are reproduced in extenso below in Part A, with spelling, punctuation and capitalisation modernised.
There follows a series of signatures to these rules, some of them (presumably in accordance with item 20) crossed out. There is then, on pp. 12 to 14, a series of dated orders, the first of 19 June 1734 and the last of 21 Dec. 1737. These are entered in different hands and signed by the member then serving as president of the club. There are a total of nineteen such orders; only a selection of the less routine are printed below in Part B of this appendix.
A. Rules 20-25
Item 20. That if any President Treasurer or other member of the said Society shall at any time hereafter refuse to pay any such forfeiture or penalty as he shall hereafter incur by virtue of these presents or any other such subsequent order as aforesaid, then in such case the President for the time being is hereby directed to strike such member's name out of this book. And such member is not to be re-admitted but on payment of such forfeitures and penalties and on payment of two shillings and six pence for his offence and re-admission and making public acknowledgement of his fault. Item 21. That any person who shall hereafter be desirous to become a member of this Society shall a week before be proposed to the said Society by some member in order for their approbation and the next night, if approved of, to be admitted paying one shilling for such his admittance. Item 22. That no person may be admitted a member of this So'ciety unless he be of some profession immediately relating to the law. Item 23. That no person that belongs to any of the offices of the Courts of Equity or the Court of the Pleas of the Exchequer shall be admitted a member of this Society. Item 24. That the members present at the time and place aforesaid, if five or more, whereof the President for the time being or his Deputy to be one, shall be deemed a Society without any regard to the absent members. And any act or order made by a majority of such present members shall be as valid and effectual as if the same were made by a majority of all the members of this Society. And that if any dispute shall arise relating to the said Society, the same shall be decided by a majority of votes, the President for the time being in case of an equality on both sides being allowed the casting or determining vote. Item 25. That if any of the members of the said Society shall at any time hereafter leave the same in order to practise in the country, his name shall be struck out of this book, but nevertheless he shall be liberty at all times when he comes to town to resort to the said Society at pleasure. But he is only to be looked upon as a member with respect to the question and debates and not for the making of any orders or by laws. 
